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I Introduction
The Indonesian monetary system and
policies have undergone at least two notice-
able changes in the past two decades. The
first major change took place in the late
1960s in conjunction with the so-called
'New Order' of the President Soeharto.
The second drastic revolution appeared in
the early 1980s. This was perhaps regarded
as a necessary step to mobilize under-
utilized resources and to expand financial
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roles when the Indonesian real sector fell
into a downturn. To be sure, these
changes seem to have worked as evolving
factors at each developing stage, but
full-blown monetary development has yet
to be realized.
After having experienced devastating in-
flation throughout the 1960s, the Indonesian
monetary authorities primarily sought two
monetary goals, one immediate and the
other longer term. The first and relatively
more important objective was to reestablish
monetary stability. It is accurate to stress
that this goal was very urgently needed
to attain political and social stability. Some
records indicate, an average of almost
two hundred percent annual inflation pre-
vailed in the 1960s prior to the official
establishment of the current Soeharto re-
gime. This high inflation was considered
partly a result of a failure or lack of
monetary policy.!) The average growth
rate of money supply was increasing more
than one hundred percent per annum dur-
ing that period. The monetary authorities
attempted to reduce the money growth
1) As widely known, this was to a greater
extent induced by an expansive monetary
policy due to fiscal sector domination.
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to a more orderly magnitude.
An orderly money market and price
stability were in fact parallel to the stability
of the rupiah exchange rate. Since the
Soeharto government adopted a policy of
no foreign exchange control, the over-
valued rupiah eventually created an en-
vironment of a massive capital outflow.
Therefore, whenever disequilibrium of ex-
change rates was perceived, it triggered
a disorderly money market in Indonesia.
It was known that there could be no
practical and effective way to enforce
foreign exchange control in an archipelago
nation like Indonesia. Thus, an economi-
cally realistic exchange rate became crucial
for monetary policy consideration, too.
Essentially, a stable money market had to
be attained first and foremost. In October
1968, the rupiah exchange rate was
realigned to 326 rupiah per one US dollar.
This new fixed exchange rate was ex-
pected to be sufficient to offset disequilib-
rium and therefore it was widely hoped
that this rate could be maintained for a
long period since the new exchange rate
was approximately a one hundred percent
below the average level of 1967.
The second goal was to diffuse the 'mon-
etary' transactions in a wider range of
the economy. The so-called monetization
process is known to possess various posi-
tive implications for economic development.
As Patrick [1966J and Gurley and Shaw
[1967J stated theoretically, financial de-
velopment serves to promote more efficient
resource allocation and investment, which
thus leads effectively to the accumulation
of the r~1;l1 capital stock. The Indonesian
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financial situation was underdeveloped jn
this regard. This was partly due to the
result of the less active policy, and also
because of geographical diversity. To at-
tain this goal, the monetary authorities
had to deal with many immediate, but
difficult tasks: for example, restructuring
the monetary system, modernizing every
financial institution and educating all
classes of people to materialize benefi ts
generated from the monetized economy.2)
As an economy advances, it is likely
that it experiences more rapid growth in
financial assets than in national output.
There are three major reasons for sec-
ularly rising financial ra tios as pointed out
by Gurley and Shaw [1967J. First, divi-
sion of labor in production that involves
exchange of factor services and outputs
implies lending and borrowing. The dis-
economies of finance-in-kind induce mone-
tization. Second, finance is associated with
a division of labor between saving and
investment. During the development proc-
ess, the division of labor between saving
and investment becomes more intricate,
and this institutional evolution usually pre-
cipitates more rapid accumulation of finan-
cial assets than of real wealth. Third,
growth in both quantity and variety of
financial assets can be further promoted.
Nevertheless, it would be wise to evalu-
ate the monetization process cautiously if
looking at only a single ratio of a mone-
tized component to some aggregate eco-
nomic indicator. That monetization process
2) The role of monetary economics in devel-
oping countries is briefly summarized in,
for example. Ghatak [1981J.
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IS essentially a dynamic historical process
and is not a conscious objective of policy
in most developing countries, as stated by
Chandavarkar [1977J. Such a process must
involve a variety of changes in the sec-
toral and regional levels over time in a
diversified economy. In the past fifteen
years, for example, it is widely reported
that the proportion of transactions-in-kind
in Indonesia has diminished considerably,
even on remote islands. A single moneti-
zation ratio probably does not reflect such
changes in those regions in an appropriate
manner. However, data limitations gen-
erally prevent proper examination of the
monetizing process in a developing country
in detail. It should be noted that the
following section serves to illustrate only
one indication of the evolution in the
Indonesian monetary sector.
A time series of monetization indicators
in Indonesia can be seen in Table 1. The
most significant increase relative to the
national output is seen in the 1980s. In
fact, between 1969 and 1984, the total
deposits at deposit banks grew almost one
hundred times larger. Such an enormous
increase in the demand for various depos-
its seem to be the result not only of policy
encouragement, but also of the evolving
process of monetization during this time
period. The former contribution to the
monetization process will be discussed in
the later part of this section. The table
suggests that the monetary sector in In-
donesia gained momentum, even though
its current stage might be still classified
premature. Monetizing development in the
early 19705 must have had a very posi-
Table 1 Selected Financial Indicators
of Monetization in Indonesia
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Total
M 1 toGDP M'z to Deposits toGDPu GDP2)
(?15) (96) (96)
1969 6.7 8.8 4.2
1970 7.7 10.3 5.1
1971 8.7 12.0 7.2
1972 10.4 14.4 7.7
1973 9.9 14.9 8.4
1974 8.8 12.3 7.2
1975 9.9 15.6 10,4
1976 10.4 17.0 11.8
1977 10.5 16,4 10.9
1978 10.9 16.7 11.0
1979 10.6 16.2 11.1
1980 10.1 16.8 12.0
1981 12.0 17.8 12.9
1982 11.9 18.5 13.5
1983 10.6 20,4 15.7
19843) 10.0 20.9 16.5
Notes, 1) M'z is defined as the sum of M 1
plus quasi-money, including foreign
currency deposits.
2) Total deposits include demand, time
and saving deposits plus foreign
currency deposits.
3) The GDP figure in 1984 is provi-
sional, which is provided by BAP-
PENAS.
Source, Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial
Statistics, various issues.
tive effect on the Indonesian economIC
development.
In the subsequent sections, we will ex-
amine the policy environment for many
monetary actions and their effects on the
economy. Section II describes the insti-
tutional framework. In Section III, the old
monetary policy under the Soeharto era,
which was maintained until the early 1980s,
is examined. This policy is compared with
a series of new financial policies witnessed
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SInce 1983 in Section IV. Final comments
are provided in the last section.
II The Indonesian Financial Structure
Rehabilitation and Stabilization Period:
Prelude to the First REPELITA
Clearly, the earlier Indonesian financial
system was under the strong influence of
Dutch control. The independent Indone-
sian monetary system could not be real-
ized until the nationalization of De Javasch
Bank in 1951. The old bank, which was
established by the Dutch in 1827, was
reinstitutionalized as the fundamental body
of the Bank Indonesia. At the same time,
more concrete actions were needed to
renovate this bank to fulfill the role of
central bank in Indonesia. Thus, the gov-
ernment introduced a series of the key
laws and guidelines in subsequent years.
The Bank Indonesia emerged as the sin-
gle central bank by statute in July 1953.
It was immediately decided that the fun-
damental monetary policy would be initiated
and supervised by the Monetary Board.
A limited number of economic ministers
and the governor of the central bank were
appointed to serve as board members.
Looking back on the 1950s and 1960s
from a modern banking perspective, the
major monetary policy instrument appears
to have been the reserve req uirement of
30 percent of all bank deposits. This
policy was maintained until 1977 without
any revision. Since there were essentially
no other visibly significant financial mar-
kets in Indonesia, commercial banking re-
mained the only formal monetary system.
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These banks were not su fficiently devel-
oped in many aspects. This situation cau-
sed the central bank constantly to face pos-
sible liquidity problems which could have
easily triggered a serious monetary crisis.
Such a situation might be easily exacerbated
by the shallow banking structure. Thus,
the seemingly high ratio of required re-
serve position was strictly enforced, though
it was not in fact the central policy instru-
ment for the BI.
Although the Bank Indonesia was in
charge of the central banking role such
as supervising banking, its relatively more
important roles were found in other areas.
The Bank Indonesia provided a large pro-
portion of credits directly to the final
demanders. This implies that this bank
behaved in the money market as if it was
a single largest and active commercial
bank. Furthermore, Bank Indonesia lent
increasingly excessive money to the
central government. In other words, this
central bank was recognized as a vital
source of the central government budgets.
This "printing money policy" eventually
led the money market to a textbook case
of hyperinflation in the early 1960s.8 )
Substantial modernization of the bank-
ing system is said to have started in 1967
under the current political regime. In that
year, Basic Banking Law No. 14 was in-
troduced and the formal banking structure
was rearranged into three types of banks
3) The causes and effects of the Indonesian
hyperinflation were examined by Aghevli
and Khan [1977J. Also, Nasution [1983J
describes thoroughly the underlying eco-
nomic conditions.
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other than the Bank Indonesia: commercial
banks, savings banks and development
banks. A t the same time, the Central
Bank Act of 1967 and 1968 were newly
enforced and its role was more strictly
and clearly defined than the earlier body
of the Bank Indonesia Act. For example,
the Bank Indonesia previously could serve
as a commercial bank, as already pointed
out. Hereafter, its traditional commercial
banking functions were transferred to
other state-owned commercial banks.
While structural rehabilitation was at-
tempted, a drastic organizational change
in the monetary policy formation was pro-
grammed. All economic policies, of which
monetary policy was a subset, came to be
managed and decided by the new Eco-
nomic Stabilization Council, in which the
President serves as chairman. The role
of the Monetary Board under the new law
was thus redefined to assist the higher
council and to implement the govern-
ment's monetary policy in a coordinated
manner. In this sense, the degree of
autonomy of the Bank Indonesia was rather
restricted. However, the Bank Indonesia
was released from the burden of the fiscal
deficit financing. It was recognized that
the major cause of inflation in the early
1960s was the government budget deficits.
Fiscal discipline was an urgent task for
the new regime. Concurrently, a balanced
budget policy and quarterly budget pro-
grammes in each fiscal year were intro-
duced. This was the most important
achievement under the new political
regime effecting economic stabilization in
the later 1960s.
Throughout this stabilization and re-
habilitation period, the banking system was
restructured on the basis of the classified
business area of each state-owned com-
mercial bank and other banks. Still, the
principle policy instrument was inherited
from the previous system: namely, admin-
istered interest rates policy with partic-
ular attention to loan rates. This policy,
widely-known as credit rationing, was
actively used to allocate scarce credits to
preferential projects or priority sectors
for the governmental objectives.4 ) In the
subsequent years, the government repeat-
edly had to adjust interest and rediscount
rates to attain its goals. Similar tight
control was introduced for the foreign
debt cases in accordance with the estab-
lishment of the IGGI.5) After having
recognized an almost insolvent position
externally in the middle of the 1960s, the
government decided to strengthen its
control and surveillance of foreign bor-
rowing and its underlying terms and
conditions. Implied in this action is a
drastic change in the government stance
toward foreign aid. The government de-
cided to increase the share of foreign
credits for financing development projects,
rather than for commodities imports such
as rice and other necessities.
The rupiah exchange rate was immedi-
ately realigned. The government then at-
4) The issue of credit rationing is popular
among developing countries. Indonesia was
not exceptional until 1983. The essential
message of this policy is described in, for
example, Johnson [1974J.
5) Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia IS
composed of major industrial countries.
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tempted to simplify the foreign exchange
system from the previous multiple ex-
change ra te mechanism [Thasan 1966J.
Throughout this gestation period, the
Indonesian monetary system, mostly the
banking sector, systematically reorganized.
In the following subsection, the structure
of the contemporary Indonesian financial
system will be explained briefly.
The Structure of the Present Indonesian
Banking System
The Indonesian financial system pres-
ently consists of the Central Bank, deposit
money banks and other non-bank financial
institutions. The last group includes tn·
vestment finance, development finance, tn-
strument trust, housing finance, insurance
and leasing companies.
The activities of Bank Indonesia, com-
mercial banks, and other banks are regu-
lated by corresponding laws. These include
the Act No. 14 of 1967 on banking prin-
ciples and the Act No. 13 of 1968 on the
Central Bank. Meanwhile, non-bank finan-
cial institutions, some of which were ob-
served as early as 1972, are currently
governed and supervised under special
decrees.
In the formal banking sector, commercial
Table 2 Relative Share of Outstanding Bank Credits by Groups
of BanksD
C%')
Bank State National Regional Foreign
Indonesia2> Owned Private Development Banks TotalBanks Banks Banks
1969 35.7 56.1 7.0 1.2 100.0
1970 26.8 64.4 6.9 2.2 100.0
1971 21.0 69.3 6.7 3.2 100.0
1972 19.3 70.1 6.7 4.0 100.0
1973 15.4 72.8 6.7 5.1 100.0
1974 16.8 72.5 6.3 4.6 100.0
1975 32.5 58.3 3.9 1.0 4.4 100.0
1976 34.0 56.3 4.5 1.1 4.2 100.0
1977 31.2 57.6 5.2 1.3 4.7 100.0
1978 35.9 52.5 5.5 1.2 4.9 100.0
1979 34.5 52.2 6.5 1.4 5.5 100.0
1980 31.1 54.6 7.2 1.8 5.3 100.0
1981 26.1 57.9 8.2 2.4 5.4 100.0
1982 21.3 61.7 9.2 2.7 5.1 100.0
1983 15.4 64.0 12.3 2.7 5.6 100.0
1984 4.6 70.9 16.2 2.7 5.6 100.0
Note: 1) Sum of shares in each year does not necessarily add up to
100.0 due to rounding.
2) Bank Indonesia credits to non-financial sector and non-
central government.
Source: See Table 1.
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banks constitute the largest operating bank-
ing entities in the country. This group
consists of five state-owned commercial
banks, ten private national foreign ex-
change banks, sixty-nine private national
banks and eleven foreign banks. There
are also twenty-eight development banks,
including one private, one national and
twenty-six regional government-owned
banks. These are assigned to grant long-
term investment credit. Two savings
banks are engaged in facilitating the mo-
bilization of savings.
In 1973 and 1974 three development
finance companies and nine investment
finance companies were established in In-
donesia. Also, PT Sarana Bersama Pembi-
ayaan Indonesia, a housing finance com-
pany, was established in June 1981. This
represents Indonesian participation in the
ASEAN Finance Corporation. The other
financial institutions include ninety-three in-
surance companies, sixty-eight leasing com-
panies and a number of other institutions
of lesser significance such as pawn shops.6)
The entire financial system in Indonesia
has developed considerably and other var-
ious types of financial services have be-
come increasingly available. There is no
doubt that this trend has helped to in-
crease the people's welfare. Nevertheless,
the dominant portion of the whole financial
system is still occupied by the banking
system. In this regard, it seems very im-
portant to know the basic functions of
each group of banks, including the Bank
Indonesia. The relative importance of
6) Those numbers are as of August of 1986.
these banks is roughly represented in the
relative share of outstanding bank credits
in Table 2.
III Development Strategy and Monetary
Policy Implementation
Major Monetary Policies Held until the
Reverse Oil Shock in 1983
Monetary authorities have been cautious
in controlling money supply. This has
been favorably assessed by many observers
recently, primarily because of its success
in reducing inflationary pressure. At the
same time, it has been critically pointed
out that Indonesian monetary policy has
created some serious difficulties for bal-
anced development within the financial
framework. Immediately after the author-
ities recognized the drawbacks of the
existing monetary conditions which were
mostly induced by the basic economic
policy, a new policy was introduced in
1983. An exarnination of the new policy
will be made in the next section. In this
section the former policies are discussed.
Since 1969, the monetary authorities have
strengthened two instruments for monetary
policy, namely, credit control through Bank
Indonesia, and interest rates restrictions
on loans and deposits through the state-
owned and regional development banks.
In order to place the money supply under
central bank control to some extent, the
authorities considered it necessary to ad-
minister financial price and quantity con-
trols. Since available credits were recog-
nized to be quite limited, the government
assumed that credit rationing was needed
631
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Table 3 Bank Indonesia Assets
(Billion Rupiahs)
Foreign Assets Domestic Assets
Credits to Credits to Credits to Total AssetsTotal Total Central Gov't Public Deposit OthersEnterprises Money Banks
1969 66 351 104 78 80 89 417
1970 83 442 102 87 111 142 525
1971 85 500 134 86 144 136 585
1972 252 423 95 111 149 68 675
1973 384 517 104 148 194 71 865
1974 611 703 91 227 294 91 1,314
1975 291 1,994 434 905 565 90 2,285
1976 655 2,348 313 1,239 640 156 3,003
1977 1,052 2,485 388 1,227 682 188 3,537
1978 1,655 3,713 615 1,937 846 315 5,368
1979 2,636 4,414 736 2,143 1,129 406 7,050
1980 4,360 5,445 799 2,414 1,722 510 9,805
1981 4,121 6,946 1,084 2,583 2,547 732 11,067
1982 3,730 9,977 1,293 2,668 3,742 2,274 13,707
1983 6,433 10,307 701 2,230 4,365 3,011 16,740
1984 9,169 12,449 729 720 6,938 4,062 21,618
Source: See Table 1.
to promote effective economic development.
Throughout the period of the first three
REPELITAs, an import substitution policy
was essentially pursued.7) The credit ra-
tioning policy was consistent with such a
development strategy.
The central bank was quite active in
performing these policies. As an inevitable
consequence, the existence and growth of
state-owned banks became increasingly em-
phasized. As Table 3 shows, among the
domestic assets of the Bank Indonesia's
balance sheets, credits to deposit money
banks, mostly supplied to the state banks,
became increasingly significant. That credit
7) REPELITA is a fi ve year economic plan and
the first one started in 1969. The third one
ended in March 1984.
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supply trend was quite visible in its
balance sheets. In 1975, the so-called Per-
tamina incident became public. Since then,
the central bank served to provide credits
directly to public enterprises and projects
in the REPELITA II years, as seen in
Table 3. Although the pace of credit
supply to those sectors declined during the
REPELITA III, the size of credits still far
exceeded a level of two trillion rupiahs
until 1983.
The Bank Indonesia credits were largely
limited to supplying intended sectors or
industries, as briefly shown in Table 4.
The changes in the size of those credits
reflect the varying policy emphasis of the
government from year to year. For ex-
ample, the agricultural sector was, as widely
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Table 4 Bank Indonesia Credit Supply
(Billion Rupiahs)
Credits to Bank Direct Credits
Agiriculture & Investment Manufacturing TotalTotal Primary Products Credits Industry Total Mining TradeSector l )
1969 80 60 6 3 87 0 72 167
1970 113 67 26 6 97 0 62 210
1971 143 67 56 3 104 0 60 247
1972 150 63 73 2 127 0 89 278
1973 195 108 73 3 155 0 118 349
1974 294 181 82 4 235 0 193 529
1975 565 321 88 106 894 726 143 1,459
1976 640 372 122 90 1,212 1,020 167 1,852
1977 682 322 183 123 1,229 1,042 176 1,911
1978 846 414 173 169 1,935 1,679 238 2,781
1979 1,129 419 277 278 2,163 1,875 248 3,292
1980 1,722 418 419 449 2,454 1,849 507 4,176
1981 2,548 535 829 625 2,649 1,644 809 5,197
1982 3,742 908 1,226 688 2,771 1,402 994 6,513
1983 4,365 801 1,685 695 2,356 720 1,110 6,721
1984 6,938 2,3202) 2,165 819 870 169 7,808
Notes: 1) This includes items such as sugar, estate, agriculture, export, cotton and wheat, as
appeared in Table 2d. in IFS.
2) The figure includes credits for food stock.
Source: See Table 1.
recognized, continuously stressed as a
central sector for the development. There-
fore this sector steadily obtained large
credits from Bank Indonesia. On the other
hand, the sudden increase of credits to the
manufacturing industry observed during
REPELITA II and III show the govern-
ment's commitment to industrial projects.
Those credits, for example, were provided
fi rst to Bank Dagang Negara to fi nance,
for example, PT Krakatau Steel.S) Direct
8) Administered credit supply sometimes leads
to expensive and inefficient projects. The
criticism against development strategy
through this kind of policy centers around
the issue of inefficiency. The cases of the
Indonesian big projects have widely been
credits to mining sector similarly reflected
the PERTAMINA borrowings.
While the Bank Indonesia's direct credits
increased visibly, the sources of credits
from the deposit money banks showed
significant changes. Various deposits
gained shares over the period, as shown
in Table 5. Since 1975, the relative share
of all deposits in total liabilities exceeded
fifty percent, attributing to the fast increase
in time and savings deposits. In many
developing economies, one of the most
serious constraints on financial development
is the lack or shortage of relatively longer
argued as similar incidents of this problem.
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Table 5 Movement of Liability Items of Deposit Money Banks
Relative Share in Total Liabilities
Foreign Borrowings Volume of TotalDemand Time and Savings Currency from Other LiabilitiesDeposits Deposits Deposits Bank Indonesia Liabilities CBillion Rupiahs)(%) (96) C%) C%) C%')
1969 20.9 0 20.6 25.3 33.2 277
1970 17.3 0 18.2 26.0 38.5 462
1971 23.4 0 19.1 24.1 33.4 619
1972 17.8 5.4 14.4 16.9 45.5 931
1973 16.3 5.6 17.6 14.2 46.3 1,440
1974 19.4 .5.8 12.7 14.8 47.4 2,039
1975 24.0 24.1 5.2 22.2 24.6 2,473
1976 24.8 26.8 5.2 20.4 22.8 3,200
1977 26.6 27.3 3.9 17.6 24.7 3,609
1978 25.1 22.1 5.5 18.1 29.2 4,761
1979 27.6 18.1 10.7 17.9 25.7 6,287
1980 30.0 15.9 12.6 17.6 24.0 9,319
1981 31.7 16.7 9.0 21.4 21.2 12,139
1982 28.2 17.0 9.6 26.5 18.7 14,654
1983 21.8 24.4 11.9 22.2 19.7 19,202
1984 18.9 25.0 11.5 27.6 17.1 25,557
Source: See Table 1.
term deposits which can be available for
longer term investment. In this regard,
this new development in Indonesia is on
the right track.
There are no readily available statistics
on the size of different deposits by various
types of commercial banks. However, it
is widely recognized that the state-owned
banks were the dominant recipient of those
deposits. This was probably due to the
simple fact that many public enterprises
and national project entities were required
to maintain all deposits with the state-
owned banks. Interest rates on deposits
at state banks were strictly controlled and
monitored by the central bank. The case
of twelve month time deposits is summa-
rized in Table 6. The table shows that
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Table 6 Time Deposits Interest Rates
with State Banks
(12 Month Time Deposits)
Date Monthly Rate Annual RateC%) (%)*
1969 July 3 42.6
September 2.5 34.5
1970 January 2 26.8
1972 May 1.5 19.6
1973 April 1.25 16.1
1974 April 1.50 19.6
December 1.25 16.1
1977 January 1 12.7
1978 January 3/4 9.4
after 1983 June Bank determined rate
* Annual Rate, compounded rate.
the central bank rarely changed the rate
through the 1970s. Though the interest
rates seemed high, the actual cost of holding
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Table 7 Lending Interest Rates by Economic Sector
Investment Credits, Medium-term Manufacturing & ServiceExport Goods Rendering IndustriesDate, from. Sector4)
Category 11) Category IV2) Textile Cement
1972 May 12 12 18 24 24
1973 April 12 12 15 18 18
1974 April 12 15 18 18 21
1974 December 12 15 15 15 18
1976 April 12 15 12 15 18
1978 January 10.5 13.5 12 13.5 13.5
1982 January 10.5 13.5 95) 13.5 13.5
1983 June 12 **3) 95) **3) **3)
Note: 1) Category I: the amount of investment credits up to Rp. 25 million before January 1978.
Since then this level has been raised to Rp. 75 million.
2) Category IV: before 1978, the amount above Rp. 300 million. Since then the amount
decreased to between Rp. 1,500 million, and above Rp. 500 million.
3) Rate determined by banks.
4) There are differentials among categories in this sector. Thus the lowest rates were
adopted.
5) Applied to promising export commodities.
time deposits was likely to be expensive.
This is simply because that the depositors
were always exposed to the rupiah cur-
rency risk. Since the government has
maintained the open capital account system,
attractive interest rates should have cor-
responded simultaneously to a stable ex-
change rate.9 ) Nonetheless the exchange
rate and interest rate policies seemed not
to have been well-integrated in the past.
Interest rates on loans to economic sec-
tors and special activities were similarly
programmed by the Bank Indonesia. Table
7 shows only a limited number of cases.
Since the government was basically seeking
import substitution in industrial sectors,
investment credits were supplied to those
sectors at relatively lower rates. In ad-
9) Because of this policy, it has been said that
there was no illicit currency market in
Jakarta.
dition, relatively smaller-sized investments
were favorably treated in terms of interest
rates. Since 1978, all activities related to
investment, export and manufacturing have
been treated almost equally by credit supply
institutions. The system of programmed
lending rates was continuously managed
until May 1983.
In comparing the two tables mentioned
above, it becomes obvious that the state
banks were in many cases induced to have
a negative interest rate margin. To mitigate
such an inconsistency, the central bank
provided a predetermined interest rate
subsidy for each loan made by the state
commercial banks. As a result, national
and foreign private banks were always
placed in a less competitive position. Con-
sequently, the state-owned banks cum Bank
Indonesia dominated in terms of the total
outstanding credits, as seen in Table 2.
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Until May 1983, the state banks were
allowed to have a deposits account abroad.
It has been allegated that a considerable
amount of the funds of the state-owned
banks was invested abroad. The open
capital account system is generally not
compatible with credit rationing policies.
Some private sector elements were induced
to borrow relatively expensive funds abroad,
since the domestic credits were tightly
controlled by the Bank Indonesia. In this
regard, the allocation of the domestic scarce
resources was distorted.
These financial developments were
caused by the government-led growth pol-
icy. Due to the two oil price increases, the
central government received massive ex-
ternal funds. However, those funds had
to be counted as fiscal receipts in a corre-
sponding fiscal year due to the existing
regulatory rule. The fiscal sector grew
at a great pace. This policy framework
itself was prone to be inflationary. Because
of fiscal regulation, the government was
not permitted to establish an independent
account such as the so-called development
funds by which the pooled money can be
allocated over longer term to realize a
stable development process. This possi-
bility was officially restricted. Neverthe-
less, the central government quietly main-
tained some portion of funds with the
central bank. After the second oil shock
in 1979, such stock roughly accounted for
one quarter to one third of the central
bank's total liabilities. The volume of these
deposits, however, was actively hoarded
as it was. This savings account had two
purposes. The first one was, as mentioned
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already, to restrain excessive fiscal expend-
itures. Another purpose was for the gov-
ernment to retain some ability to control
the money market. The overall operation
of manipulating the government account
is generally termed as neutralization policy.
In December 1977, for example, the long
maintained required reserve ratio of the
total liabilities with commercial banks dras-
tically decreased from 30 to 15 percent.
The former reserve requirement seemed
very burdensome to bankers by any stan-
dard. Such a drastic change might have
caused an expansion of money supply
through the banking system. So the mon-
etary authorities increased deposit stock
of the government by more than 50 percent.
During the three years following the second
oil shock, government deposits increased
so as to mitigate the money supply increase.
At the same time the Bank Indonesia
attempted to reduce other liabilities rela-
tively.
However, those active policies by the
government made the central bank de-
crease the use of common monetary instru-
ments. The central bank was to a greater
extent dependent on the government de-
velopment schemes. It is generally desir-
able that a central bank be able to perform
as an independent monetary institution
even in a developing economy. This feature
of a central bank is particularly important
in order to preserve real currency value.
In the case of Indonesia, Bank Indonesia
acted frequently as a competitive lender
with other commercial banks. As already
shown, its share in total outstanding credits
was not small each year. The question
f,,
(,
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IS whether the central bank's direct par-
ticipation in various projects was necessary
in the foreseeable future. If the monetary
system were still needed as it had been,
then the Bank Indonesia would not need
to act as the bank for banks. The domi-
nation of the fiscal sector and public en-
terprises in the Indonesian economy did
not mean that such a massive number
of state-owned banks would remain inno-
vative. Some observers felt that some
kind of reform was needed. However,
a t the same time, they also recognized
that a reform of this kind of monetary
system was very difficult because those
banks had been acting mostly as an agent
bank for public projects and enterprises.
In regard to credit-rationing measures,
the direct operation of the central bank
in credit markets had taken away the
potential of private financial institutions.
The managed system of the Indonesian
monetary activities had long functioned
because of the injection of enormous
amounts of funds earned from exporting
oil and oil products into the economy.
Around the middle of 1982, the monetary
authorities expressed their concern about
the effectiveness of the existing monetary
system to enhance future economic devel.
opment. This issue was also highlighted
by the sudden reduction of foreign assets
with the Bank Indonesia. The central
bank of course held the option of devalu-
ating the rupiah. However, measure was
difficult in 1982. Since economic growth
had started declining slightly, such an
inflationary measure might have hurt the
standard of living of the public. Between
1981 and 1982, government deposits there·
fore could not be increased.
To escape from the reverse oil trap,
the enduring system of fiscal and monetary
policies were questioned. While the agri-
cultural sector made considerable progress
in production, the authorities started to
reevaluate whether the financial system
grew enough to stimulate, particularly, the
stagnant industrial sector. The primary
concern was how the reorganized financial
system could effectively work both to
expand the manufacturing foundation and
to promote exports. Weakness of the
Indonesian economic structure due to the
overwhelming influence of the public sector
and excessive reliance on the oil sector.
The industrial sector, in which the govern-
ment spent a considerable amount of money
in the past, was not sufficiently capable
of exporting their products and could not
get strong and stable without official finan-
cial support. Under such circumstances,
monetary authorities must rigorously seek
both to increase efficiency in the monetary
system and to mobilize resources, especially
in export industries. A new monetary
policy was decisively introduced in June
1983.
Factors Affecting Changes m Monetary
Supply
It is widely known that the Indonesian
money supply was greatly and directly
affected by external economic events and
often by the structural changes in the
financial system. Understanding the anat·
omy of the money supply, thus, is very
important for distinguishing various causes
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and effects of money supply changes.
Growth goals were often constrained by
difficulties with the balance of payments
and threatened by pressure on price levels.
Whenever an excessive supply of money
appeared to stimulate economic activity
and promote further monetization, it was
likely to lead an almost instant price
increase and thus an expected rupiah deval-
uation. The ramifications of such resulted
in the deterioration in the Indonesian BOP.
Within such an economic environment,
stabilization policy was very difficult. In
many instances, monetary stimulation of
economic development did not always seem
compatible with price stability in Indonesia.
The supply of commodities, whether those
of necessity or capital goods, was severely
constrained. Since the motive of money
holding was essentially limited in the trans-
action purpose as will be examined below
and the alternative financial assets were
also limited,10) the failure of the money
supply seemed closely linked to the price
change.
The monetary authorities seemed to be
aware of this sensitive relationship. During
the Soeharto era, even though the main
thrust of financial policy was the direct
control of credits and prices, monetary
authorities were carefully monitoring the
effect on the level of money supply. Of
course, this was not publicly stated as a
policy target. But the money supply ob-
served in the past was mostly within
10) The transaction motive of money demand
in LDCs is the foundation of the McKinnon
model as well as Gurley and Shaw model.
See McKinnon [1973J, for example.
638
tolerable levels even during the period
immediately after the two oil shocks. In
this sense, it may be appreciated that the
monetary authorities did not make light of
the firm stabilization policy. In general,
the governmental projects and entities are
likely to demand excessive credit through
the political channels. This is likely to
aggravate the money supply increase.
However, the Indonesian monetary author-
ities tended to reduce such pressure, except
a few cases such as Pertamina-related
projects. The overall credit line was fairly
tightly controlled under the discipline.
To view this money supply management,
changes in money supply are quantitatively
analyzed here, as Bhatia[1971]attempted.ll)
The money supply (LIM) is roughly caused
by either behavioral causal factors (LlMk )
or non-behavioral causal factors (LlML ).
The former is related to changes in various
elements which will eventually result in
a change in the money multiplier. The
latter can be seen as changes in the
11) The following is the list of variables used in
this section:
M: narrowly defined money supply, in
which currency in circulation and
demand deposits are included
Mk: a portion of money supply which is
related to behavioral causal factors
ML : a portion of money supply linked to
non-behavioral causal factors
k : money multiplier
L: central bank liabilities
MF: foreign assets owned by the central
bank
MG: net credits to the government of the
central bank
Mp : central bank's other assets which
resulted from policies of the bank
The sOurce of data is described in the note
of Table 9.
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in circulation to the
money stock
and r== ~ = the ration of the re-
serve to demand deposits.
The ex post money supply is expressed
as a product of the central bank's monetary
base and the money multiplier. Accord-
ingly, two sources of the money supply
change are derived in the following func-
tional forms:
J (ML)t~LlLtok t- 1
J (Mk ) t "-'Lt'Llkt
where L represents the central bank
liabilities and t denotes the period of
time.
As indicated above, the change in the
central bank liabilities is subdivided into
changes owing to foreign assets (LlMF ) ,
net credits to the government (LlMG) and
others (LlMp ) which result from various
activities of the central bank:
JML =JMF +AMG +LlMp
c r k
1969 .634 .500 1.220
1970 .620 .396 1.278
1971 .620 .413 1.287
1972 .574 .480 1.285
1973 .561 .391 1.365
1974 .527 .564 1.260
1975 .500 .611 1.242
1976 .487 .636 1.230
1977 .488 .607 1.252
1978 .498 .442 1.389
1979 .459 .426 1.450
1980 .431 .372 1.556
1981 .394 .305 1.728
1982 .412 .241 1.806
1983 .440 .352 1.570
1984 .433 .351 1.582
1985 .439 .334 1.597
Note: c=C/M, r=R/D.
C is the amount of currency in circula-
tion and M is the narrowly defined
money supply. R is reserve money and
D represents demand deposits.
Source: All data are provided by Bank Indo-
nesia and BAPPENAS.
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Table 8 Currency Ratio (c), Reserve
Ratio (r) and Money Multi-
plier (k)
Therefore, the change in money supply
is ultimately represented in the equation:
LlM= LlMF +JMG +LlMp + LlMk
Table 8 describes the time series of
money multiplier and its components, for
the case of narrow money supply. There
are clear tendencies in these indicators in
the past years. The money multiplier has
been increasing and two components show
a gradual decline. These movements gener-
ally fit the pattern for a process of financial
modernization. The sudden decline in the
ratio of reserves to deposits in 1978 reflects
the policy change of the reserve require-
currencywhere
liabilities of the central bank. Of course,
the movement of the liabilities corresponds
to changes in the composition of assets
of the central bank. Thus sources of
money supply change are clarified by exam-
ining these two factors.
By the definition, the change in the
money supply is summarized as follows:
LlM=LlML +LlMk
Assuming that money is the sum of cur-
rency in circulation and demand deposits,
that is, narrowly defined money, the money




c==M = the ratio
ment ratio reduction from 30 to 15 percent.
Another decline of this ratio in 1982 was
induced by the readjustment of reserves
held by the deposit money banks. Although
the central bank has paid interest on the
excess reserve held with Bank Indonesia,
deposit money banks have always been
concerned about a possible devaluation
of rupiah value. While observing the
reduction of official international reserves
since 1981, the deposit money banks tried
to minimize their currency risk exposure
of excess reserves. It should be noted
that the exchange rate system was trans-
formed from the fixed to the managed
floating exchange system in 1978.
Money supply change, represented In
Table 9, clearly reflects these events. Until
the middle of the 19705, behavioral factors
had affected money supply by lowering the
money multiplier, although only slightly.
This feature was manifested through the
close relations between the central bank
and the state-owned banks. The central
bank's credit rationing closely corresponded
to the assets management of these deposit
money banks. The drastic change observed
in 1983 was simply a result of currency
risk avoidance of deposit money banks
made in 1982. In this year, the rupiah
was devalued by 28 percent. Since then,
the multiplier returned to a normal level.
As explained above, non-behavioral fac-
tors were mostly induced by exogenous
or policy reasons. These sources can be
traced by looking at the asset side of central
bank balance sheets. Table 10 represents
the relative contribution by sources to Bank
Indonesia total assets holding. Basically,
640
Table 9 Money Supply Changes: Behavioral
and Non-Behavioral
M1 .JHPMt kt-l . HPM.Jkt
1969
1970 100.0 78.1 21.9
1971 100.0 104.3 -4.3
1972 100.0 100.6 -0.6
1973 100.0 78.5 21.5
1974 100.0 127.9 -27.9
1975 100.0 106.0 -6.0
1976 100.0 104.6 -4.6
1977 100.0 91.8 8.2
1978 100.0 46.7 53.3
1979 100.0 84.5 15.5
1980 100.0 77.7 22.3
1981 100.0 57.8 42.2
1982 100.0 46.9 53.1
1983 100.0 353.6 -253.6
1984 100.0 93.3 6.7
1985 100.0 94.1 5.9
Note: The Bank Indonesia data from IFS
were used to derive all figures.
Source: See Table 1.
assets composition has been predominantly
affected in most years by changes in foreign
assets. One can easily identify the rapid
increase of foreign assets when the rupiah
was devalued in 1971, 1978 and 1983 and
similarly when oil export prices were
increased in 1973 and 1979. Those increases
had considerable magnitude as the table
shows. In corresponding years, it is im-
portant to recognize the large reduction in
the net asset position to the government.
This in fact was the increase of the
government deposits with the central bank.
The overall effect, considering both these
changes, was not so large. This delib-
erate attempt to minimize the external
shocks on money supply was the so-called
neutralization policy. It was a characteristic
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Table 10 Sources of Changes in the Bank Indonesia's Total Assets
(%)
TA AF AG APE APR ABK AR
1969
1970 100.0 17.3 9.9 -12.4 19.8 38.3 27.2
1971 100.0 -0.9 76.4 21.8 -24.6 30.0 -2.7
1972 100.0 236.8 -136.8 36.8 5.9 7.4 -50.0
1973 100.0 62.1 -17.7 23.5 1.3 29.4 1.3
1974 100.0 80.8 -31.8 23.3 0 29.2 -1.5
1975 100.0 -93.6 -55.1 169.0 1.3 69.5 7.4
1976 100.0 82.6 -73.3 70.2 1.6 16.6 2.4
1977 100.0 187.6 -82.8 9.0 0 17.6 -31.3
1978 100.0 49.2 -24.5 57.9 1.0 13.7 2.7
1979 100.0 105.1 -68.6 23.5 1.3 30.5 8.2
1980 100.0 151.3 -146.0 25.8 2.3 56.4 10.2
1981 100.0 -27.1 -57.0 25.2 5.8 122.4 30.8
1982 100.0 -13.7 8.8 3.1 2.9 44.6 54.3
1983 100.0 203.1 -164.2 -54.0 0.1 76.8 38.2
1984 100.0 95.7 -71.0 -52.9 1.7 90.1 36.4
1985 100.0 32.9 26.0 1.1 3.5 18.6 18.0
Note: TA : Total assets,
AF : Foreign assets,
AG : Claims on Central Government (Net),
APE: Claims on Public Enterprises,
APR: Claims on Private Sector,
ABK: Claims on Deposit Money Banks,
AR : Others.
Source: See Table 1.
approach made implicitly by monetary au-
thorities. Exceptions are seen in 1975 and
1981. In the first case, the Pertamina
incident forced the central bank to increase
direct credits to this public enterprise.
Thus the reduction in foreign assets was
more than offset. In another case, a deteri-
oration of the balance ofpayments reduced
the level of official international reserves.
Thus, the increase in the central bank's
total assets declined by almost 40 percent
relative to the level of the previous year.
Since credit supply to deposit money banks
increased to almost the same level as before,
the relative contribution to the central bank
asset composition visibly differred in that
year. External shock caused influences
which appeared on the Indonesian balance
of payments.
Increasing difficulties appeared with the
balance of payments after 1982 forced the
government to adopt another direct mea-
sure. By that time, the policy-makers were
probably aware of economic costs of public
projects which had been considered the
core of high economic growth. If the
traditional strategy for growth was main-
tained, pressure on the balance of payments
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would become increasingly intolerable. The
government announced a new policy in
1983, in which big projects requiring too
much foreign exchange would be frozen.
The message· of this new governmental
decision implied a severe cut in direct
credit supply to public enterprises. Simul-
taneously the monetary authorities intro-
duced a new measure to activate market
forces in the money market.
When one examines the history of money
supply management in Indonesia until 1983,
it can be seen how monetary authorities
had to cope with external shocks. The
choice of the authorities was often limited
to the use of the government account with
the central bank. The business with the
deposit money banks was probably a less
significant instrument for money supply
control even though the administered bank-
ing system was unquestionable. Policy
made in that way by the Bank Indonesia
was direct, precise and quick to have the
intended effects. The central bank may
simply have been reluctant to deal with
the shallow banking system and to adjust
less significant policy instruments. Obvi-
ously, this kind of policy environment is
undesirable if the monetary system is to
fulfill a substantial role in the economic
development and if its base is to be
enlarged. In this regard, the old policy
and its instruments seemed to have almost
reached the limits of their usefulness.
Demand for Money in Indonesia
While monetary assets were willingly
held, it is still useful to examine the demand
motives of such monetary assets.12) As
Keynesian theory postulates, money is actu-
ally demanded as a store of value in addition
to its use for transaction purposes. The
portfolio demand for money depends on
the opportunity costs of holding money.
When money is properly defined, the de-
mand function for money can be specified
with a limited number of variables. As
long as the demand for money is proved
to be stable, money supply can be a
powerful policy instrument at least in the
short run. If money is excessively supplied
over the long run, as stated by the quantity
theory, a price increase is the sole outcome.
This occurred in Indonesia prior to 1969,
as mentioned earlier.13 )
The estimated demand for money equa-
tion is summarized as follows:
log ~1 = -8. 781+1. 281 log(y)
(-5.61) (6.83)
- O. 188 log (x) + O. 206 log (T)
(2. 08) (2. 61)
R2=0.984, DW= 1. 591,
SSR = O. 0544, 1959-1983
and
M'logp= -9.264+1. 363 log(y)
( -6.65) (8. 17)
-0.201 log (x) +0.272 10g(T)
(2. 70) (3. 87)
R2=0.992, DW=2. 158,
SSR=0.0431, 1969-1983
where Ml and M' are defined as narrow
12) There are many documents concerning the
importance of the demand for money. Lai.
dler [1969J and Johnson [1972J, for example,
are useful materials in explaining theoret-
ically and empirically relevant issues. The
empirical test for the case of Indonesia is
attempted by Boediono [1985J.
13) See Grenville [1981J, iIi particular, pp. 107-
110.
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and broad money, respectively. The latter
includes quasi-money as defined in the
Monetary Survey by the IMF. P is the
consumer price index. Real income, proxied
by real GDP in 1973 prices, is represented
by y. T represents the time trend. This
variable is necessary to describe the con-
tinuing monetization process. Since we
define monetization as a process of diffusion
of money holding, it is hypothesized to
increase with time. Time trend is therefore
expected to capture this process. The
interest rate of alternative financial assets
is usually considered as an opportunity cost
of holding money. Since there have not
existed any significant capital markets in
Indonesia, an appropriate variable is not
readily available. However, one should
not disregard that the Indonesian govern-
ment has been employing an open capital
account policy. This means that the resi-
dents have not been restricted in transfer-
ing funds abroad. The major determinant
of capital outflow seems to have been the
rupiah currency and political risk prospects.
I t is difficult to know the degree to which
the exchange rate is overvalued. For our
purposes, it is assumed that the real ex-
change rate differential between the rela-
tive inflation rates in Indonesia CPt) and
the world (PW t ) represents approximately
the degree of under- (or over-) valuation
of the rupiah. To construct a simple index,
the current real exchange rate is deflated
by the exchange rate of 1969, so that
this measure,
is obtained.
Both equations fit data well, and all
coefficients possess the expected sign. It
is found that the exchange rate variable,
whether it is overvalued or not, plays a
key role for the portfolio motive in de-
termining the money demand. Also, the
process of monetization is statistically sig-
nificant within the range of observations.
I t is shown as an increase in the money
demand not along with the motives theo-
retically postulated, but along with time
elapsed.
The coefficient of real income exceeds
unity in both cases by which elastic demand
for transaction motives is implied. There
are some other empirical studies in which
income elasticities were similarly re-
ported.l4 ) Nevertheless, the interpretation
of this coefficient may be rather difficult
since there is little theoretical reason for
money to be treated as a luxury commodity.
In Indonesia, there remains the question
of what proportion of economic activities is
covered by recorded monetary income. It is
suspected, for example, that a fairly large
amount in the service sector has not been
well-documented in income data. Rather,
it is evident that the unrecorded portion
has played a key role in absorbing the
unduly large labor force. In addition, it
is noteworthy that the unmonetized sector
may remain considerably large. Thus, re-
corded income may underestimate actual
economic activities in Indonesia. N one the-
less, the supply and demand for money
suggest that during the relatively low
inflation period in the past, Indonesian
14) For example, see Boediono [1985J, Table 4
on p.91.
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monetary conditions have progressed in a
stable manner. The time trend, which
represents one measure of the pace of
monetization process, has a positive figure
and is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. The important motive of
the money demand in Indonesia is a cost
of speculative motive in terms of the
relative price of rupiah. Whenever the
rupiah was thought overvalued relative to
other currencies, pressure on the exchange
rate appeared since there were limited
domestic hedging instruments against such
a shock. The way to protect the real
value of financial wealth was to switch to
other currencies, most often to the US
dollar. 15 ) The estimated elasticity coeffi-
cients in both cases are approximately -0.2
and statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. This implies that expectation of
rupiah devaluation has been one of the key
variables to explain the Indonesian demand
for money.
IV New Financial Development Since
1983
Aims of Policy Changes and Immediate
Results
The official explanation of the June
1, 1983 Monetary Policy was to encourage
15) An interesting analysis is presented to ex·
plain the development and expansion of the
Jakarta Dollar market by Arndt and Njoman
[1982J. They stated correctly that this new
phenomenon would serve to increase the
economic well-being in Indonesia. This is
because the market would encourage much
wider activities of this kind to create domes.
tic rather than foreign hedging opportuni.
ties for Indonesian residents.
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banks to maximize the mobilization of their
funds from the public and thereby reduce
their dependence on the central bank for
low cost funds in their lending activities.
This objective seemed to correspond well
with both short run and long run policy
considerations.
In the short run, Indonesia had to re-
form its monetary system to incorporate
more competitive factors. As pointed out,
the monetary system, which was domi-
nated by state-owned banks, was inherently
induced by the various controls of the
monetary authorities. The interest rate
ceiling did not seem to be effective in
promoting investment, especially, in the
private sector since credits had been lim-
ited. Consequently, the central bank was
forced to allocate funds among programs
which were often not chosen on the basis
of efficiency. Once those programs were
officially acknowledged, it was common
for them to have been preserved at con-
siderable economic cost.16) The state banks
had established a channel with Bank Indo-
nesia to receive large credits,mounting ineffi-
ciency which could not be easily eliminated.
In addition, those institutions were not
prohibited access to external financial mar-
kets. Thus those institutions were enabled
to utilize this portfolio option. This sug-
gests that state-owned banks could have
16) Interest rates ceilings are quite popular in
developing countries in recent economic
studies. Many economists point out that the
cost of financial repression, which is
mostly due to the limited scope of interest
rate adjustment, should not be underesti-
mated. Fry [1980J, Khatkhate [1980J, Roe
[1982J and Tybout [1983J are some of repre-
sentative studies recently reported.
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an 'opportunity for handsome earnings
abroad. It may not be unrealistic to say
that this type of vicious circle could only
have probably survived because of abun-
dant oil earnings in the central govern-
ment. To break up those linkages, the
policy makers had to change their basic
policy stance. In particular, guided resource
allocation needed to be questioned. In
a similar vein, the monetary authorities
considered whether to abandon the credit
rationing policy and the interest rate ceil-
ing. In the early 1980s, this change was
imminent. By that time, it was widely
speculated that oil earnings would not be
so promising in the future.
If the interest rate ceiling were to be
dismantled the depositors would be ex-
pected to become better-off. Competitive
interest rates should reflect all sorts of
information ona wide spectrum of eco-
nomic activities. Thus, when liquidity be-
comes low enough, interest rates should
be adjusted upward. This means that
whenever the rupiah IS expected to de-
preciate, the rise in the rate of interest
would help protect depositors from the
currency risk. Depositors therefore could
face a proper set of choices between real
goods or monetary assets, even though
capital market in Indonesia is not well
developed. Contrary to what financial re-
pressionists assert, once the money market
is greatly liberated, the public can shift
their expenditure from goods consumption
to savings. Of course, the Indonesian mon-
etized sector is small. Nevertheless, the
learning process may not be limited, but
rather it may enlarge the e~onomi~ basis.
In addition to the on-going monetization
III Indonesia as evident in Table 1, the
financial institutions can have a greater
degree of freedom to mobilize funds. A
liberalized monetary system, even though
it may be partial, can be useful to enhance
total efficiency in the economy.
In the long run, the Indonesian economy
must inevitably change its structure. This
structural change includes, at least, two
aspects. One is to encourage private sec-
tor production. Because of the high eco·
nomic growth goal, the government has
stressed direct intervention in the market.
Thus, this development seems to be ham-
pered by the basic economic approach.
There is an obvious reason for which the
public sector cannot grow with the past
speed: Oil revenues will not continue to be
large. There are many theories to support
this dismal but realistic prediction. Ad-
ditionally, even though government spend.
ing would be an easy way to raise the
growth rate, many technocrats have re-
cognized that this policy creates an exces-
sive economic cost which is difficult to
compensate with other policy measures.
So long as the government intends to
pursue the growth goal, the expansion
of the private industrial sector is necessary.
As widely discussed among policy-makers,
the private industrial base is seriously
underdeveloped. Whether it is liked or
not, an industrial policy for long-term
consideration may be worth studying, as
Japan, Korea and other Asian NICs have
become quite successful in such a way.
In this regard, future success will depend
directly or indirectly on the size of the
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newly mobilized funds. It is essential that
capital flows into the private manufacturing
industries. It is also felt that these sectors
are the capable of absorbing the massive
labor force. 17 )
The second aspect of the long run ap-
proach is related to the Indonesian balance
of payments. Import substitution has not
yet contributed a great deal to the balance
of payments. On the contrary, that policy
actually required a lot of expensive
capital equipment.IS) Obviously, this policy
can contribute to the growth without
aggravating the balance of payments only
if the value of oil exports remains prom-
Ismg. As far as the future course of
economic development is concerned, Indo-
nesia must become less and less dependent
on the oil sector. President Soeharto's
remark on the 'take-off' may assume this
point in which the Indonesian balance of
payments should not be significantly af-
fected by the conditions of the world oil
market. In this sense, Indonesia must
rely increasingly on the exportable indus-
tries in the nex t decade or so. The pre-
vious monetary system and policy were
17) The current economic plan was in part
created in the belief that five percent
economic growth is needed to mitigate the
labor force pressure on the market. And
it is obvious that in that goal the manufac-
turing sector must play a leading role. See
also the next section for more explantion.
18) In general, it is known that the cost of
import substitution will become far excessive.
In this regard, export promotion versus im.
port substitution must be carefully examined
for the case of Indonesia. This study cannot
deal thoroughly with this topic because of
its limited scope. For further discussion,
see, for example, Krueger [1978J.
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not consistent witha such a change. If these
policies had not changed, the economic
situation of the Indonesian economy would
probably be impaired.
The newly introduced reform is along
these lines and has been accepted as a
step in the right direction. There are
three specific changes in the new policy:
first, state-owned banks can freely set
their deposit rates on alI maturities, except
for the small savings program; second,
credit ceilings are abolished for all banks;
third, the number of programs qualifying
for new Bank Indonesia credits are min-
imized. Immediately after these changes,
an enormous increase in volume of time
deposits was observed, for example, with
state banks. Table 11 shows monthly data
from 1983. Clearly, the effect of policy
change appeared instantaneously. In six
months after the new policy, time deposits
expanded by more than 130 percent. Due
to the change in monetary policy, a slight
decline in the dominance of state banks
has been observed, as evident from Table
12. Even though the immediate increase
in time deposits was favorably welcomed,
some serious problems remain unanswered.
After the reform, deposit rates have stayed
relatively high. The official explanation
was that domestic interest rates should
now be determined by the market.
However, the real rate of interest in In-
donesia, after adjusting the ex-post con-
sumer price index, has been far exceeding
the international level. One possible rea-
son for this is that there has been con-
stant uncertainty about the rupiah. value.
Domestic monetary reform may not be
l,
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Table 11 The Immediate Effect of the New Policy in June 1983 on Time Deposits
with State Banks and Selected Deposits Interest Rates
Time Deposits (in Billion Rupiah) Interest Rates (in % p. a.) 2)
3 Month 6 Month 12 Month Total Time 3 Month 12 Month
Deposits l ) Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits
1983
January 3.4 12.2 39.1 911.8
February 3.4 11.4 40.1 904.7
March 3.6 11.6 42.3 905.8 9.6 9.6
April 3.3 11.2 42.6 895.9
May 8.1 26.9 41.2 911.8
June 129.6 119.3 111.9 1,124.0 16.5 16.5
July 200.0 142.8 217.9 1,287.1
August 262.7 200.3 352.7 1,500.0
September 297.7 210.4 417.0 1,581. 7 16.2 16.6
October 390.5 327.4 480.3 1,830.4
November 465.8 344.5 683.6 2,094.9
December 449.1 298.6 837.9 2,125.8 15.7 17.4
Note: 1) Less than 3 month deposits are also included.
2) Those rates are some sample interest rates with an unspecified state bank.
Source: Bank Indonesia, Weekly Report.
Table 12 The Share of Group of Banks in Total Assets and Loans
in the 1980s
Assets March March March March MarchGroup of Banks or 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984Loans
Assets 79.0 79.8 79.6 77.0 74.8
State Banks
78.9 78.5 78.4 74.4Loans 80.1
National Private Assets 8.9 9.4 9.9 11.2 13.9
Banks Loans . 9.9 10.7 11.0 11.9 15.5
Regional Develop- Assets 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.5
ment Banks Loans 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1
Foreign Banks Assets 8.6 6.9 6.9 8.6 7.8
Loans 7.9 7.6 7.3 6.5 7.0
Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total
Loans 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, 1980/81, 1981/82 and
1983/84.
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sufficient to eliminate this kind of market
uncertainty. Another explanation is that
more time is needed to realize a desirable
condition in the money market, thus present
conditions may be transitory. Otherwise,
this high real rate may reflect a high
return in a real sector, as neoclassical
growth theory predicts, since the Indone-
sian economic growth has not been so
bad compared with many other developing
countries.
A t the same time, the spread between
deposit and borrowing rates was frequently
noted to be substantially large even after
the reform. Since borrowing rates were
not openly available, it is difficult to make
a definitive conclusion. However, there is
strong reason to believe this view. Due
to deregulation, banks tended to prefer
adjustable rates when extending credits.
A growing proportion of credits has been
made on this adjustable system. This
tends to increase interest rate volatility
and thus to raise borrowing risk. Banks
have now become more cautious in pro-
viding further credits to existing and
potential borrowers. The thinner the mar-
ket spread is, more efficient the financial
market is, as typically exemplified by the
Euromoney market. In this regard, the
Indonesian money market needs to be
further improved.
In addition to this market uncertainty,
the realized and maintained high deposit
rates may be explained as follows. The
sudden reform in the monetary policy
induced the Bank Indonesia to restrain
liquidity credits. State banks, in particular,
experienced a severe shortage. Prior to
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the reform, state banks were the main
suppliers of funds to the interbank market
because they had excessive reserve. The
source of excess reserves was the Bank
Indonesia liquidity credits. Thus, the new
development in the money market reversed
the situation for state banks. All banks,
not just state banks, had to compete in
attracting deposits. At least, in the first
year after June 1983, the competition was
fierce and a dramatic effect on time deposits
was observed. Effects on savings and
certificate of deposits (CDs) were of a
lesser magnitude since not all banks were
permitted to participate in these areas.
Meanwhile, strong credit demand con-
tinued despite the economic slowdown.
The leading borrowers were state-enter-
prises such as Pertamina, Krakatau Steel
and Bulog. The strong demand eventually
supported the high rates of interest which
were established immediately after the
reform.
In September 1984, a minor money
market CrISIS occurred. 19) The interbank
money rate suddenly increased to an
unacceptable level of 90 percent. Even
though the crisis was temporary, the in-
cident gave a message to the market and
monetary authorities. It revealed a weak
aspect of the Indonesian money market.
Some commented critically about the abi-
lity of the central bank's crisis manage-
ment and ineffective supervisory services
to marginal banks. Essentially, the crisis
was caused by a serious shortage of
19) Nasution [1985J also explains the economic
background of this disturbance. See his
article, especially, on pp. 20-21.
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rupiah liquidity. Without the Bank Indo-
nesia credit facilities, there was no alter-
native source of financing. The central
bank encouraged use of the interbank
market. So this single shock, probably
from a widespread rupiah devaluation ru-
mor, impinged on the money market, then
spectacular pressure appeared in the in-
terbank money market. This incident
clearly demonstrated that the central bank
need to facilitate more practical instruments
in the financial sector.
Follow-up Policy Measures
A sweeping reformation of government
economic policy thought occurred before
the fourth REPELITA. Although the
overall revision in government develop-
ment strategy was not explicitly announced,
a departure from import substitution was,
at least, taken into account. Otherwise,
the relative share of the public sector
in the whole economy would have contin-
uously been growing at the expense of
the export sector. By the end of 1983,
it looked almost certain that the world
economy would remain slow. Indonesian
exports, oil and others, seemed likely to
be less promising unless drastic policy
measures were employed. Therefore, a
change in the policy seemed inevitable for
the sake of the balance of payments and
continued economic growth. Sustained eco-
nomic growth is the goal for the next
fi ve years. This goal may be difficult to
achieve without an enlarged industrial base
and the promotion of the non-oil export
sector. The ambitious plan, five percent
growth target through 1989, was an-
nounced and became effective in 1984.
The monetary authorities can no longer
use direct intervention in credit supply.
They have to create alternative policy
instruments. Indirect measures have been
studied. Even though high economic
growth was stressed in the plan, price
stability is also equally emphasized be-
cause of social and political considerations.
This means that money supply will need
to be restrained within a tolerable level.
As pointed out in an earlier section, there
seems to have existed a clear relationship
between inflation and money supply in the
past. The central bank's concern now
shifted, though not completely, from credit
supply to discrete 'monetary' policy, be-
cause the implementing function of liquidity
supply moved from Bank Indonesia to
other banks. In this sense, the central
bank entered into a new era of policy
operation.
To fulfill this new requirement, the
Bank Indonesia announced two types of
rediscount facilities in February 1984.
The first one is the installation of the
rediscount window. This serves to assist
all banks, both state and non-state banks,
in day-to-day liquidity management. Since
the maximum maturity of this facility is
set at two weeks, it is supposed to be
used for very short-term purposes. The
second rediscount facility is for relatively
longer purposes. In a case of sudden
decline in deposits growth, banks will face
some difficulty in arranging long-term loan
commitments. To help banks avoid po-
tential mismatch, Bank Indonesia provides
rediscount services for the duration of
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two to four months.
Initially, the Bank Indonesia assumed
that these policy facilities would be used
for the lender-of-the-Iast-resort purposes.
Maximum access to the two facilities,
short-term and long-term, was set to 5
and 3 percent of total deposits, respectively.
Combined access of 8 percent of total
deposits was allowed. Since the interbank
market was expected to grow and open
to all deposit banks, the central bank en-
couraged banks to borrow through the
interbank money market. Unfortunately,
a severe liquidity shortage in September
1984 was revealed in this market when
many banks were reluctant to use the
rediscount facility windows because of the
central bank attitude concerning these fa-
cilities. Immediately after this incident,
Bank Indonesia reversed its policy to en-
courage banks to utilize these facilities.
The change was easily apparent, since
accessibility of banks to the interbank
money market later had to be restricted
in October 1984. The imposed ceiling on
outstanding borrowings from the market
became 7.5 percent of a bank's liabilities.
In August 1985, the limit was raised to
15 percent.
Another important development is the
appearance of short-term securities issued
by the central bank. The Bank Indonesia
Debt Certificates (SBls) were revived for
possible use on the open market in Febru-
ary 1984. They were first issued in 1970.
However, abundant liquidity created by
the oil boom had made the central bank
less enthusiastic to promote SBIs. Banks
were encouraged to invest excess reserves
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in foreign assets. As a result, the is-
suance of the central bank certificates
ceased.
The policy change in 1983 deregulated
interest rates. This was the end of the
administered interest rate system. At the
same time, the Bank Indonesia decided
not to pay interest on rupiah and foreign
exchange reserves. Instead of preferential
treatment for bank reserves, to manage
the bank liq uidity definitely the central
bank needs an instrument to absorb or
release such a liquidity from banks.
Thus, SBIs should be reasonably attractive
to banks. An SBIs auction was therefore
introduced and FICORINVEST (or Bank
Indonesia, if necessary) was put in charge
of this dealing. It is hoped that a system-
atic structure of interest rates in the
market will coalesce around the SBI
rate. So far, there appears to be no
secondary market for SBIs in Indonesia.
Along with active development in the
Indonesian money market, the monetary
authorities found it necessary to permit
money market instruments (SBPUs). The
government did not have any reason not
to mobilize resources by these in a wider
range of markets. Therefore SBPUs were
allowed starting in January 1985. These
securities are essentially contingent liabili-
ties of the banks or non-bank financial
institutions. There are three kinds of
SBPUs: first, promissory notes issued by
financial institutions; second, similar notes
issued by customers of eligible financial
institutions, when they borrow from such
customers; and third, bills of exchange
issued by third parties and endorsed by
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eligible financial institutions.
SBPUs are rediscountable up to certain
limits at FICORINVEST, entitling it to
set selling and buying rates for SBPUs
of different maturities. Bank Indonesia
regulates the eligibility of participants and
instruments and also the maximum interest
rate from the standpoint of the market
quality. So far, the active use of SBPUs
has concentrated on the shorter maturity
of first type. And state banks are less
enthusiastic to utilize SBPUs. These state
banks are still accessible to low cost re-
financing from the central bank and to
low cost deposits from the governmental
institutions and public entities. In other
words, the SBPU market is very seg-
mented. Nonetheless, the direction of devel-
opment in the money market seems prom-
ising and the financial world generally
welcomed this policy. It is too early to
make a conclusive judgement concerning
effects of these new events at present.
Related to this monetary deregulation,
foreign banks, which had been under the
severe restricitions, have been permitted
to extent export credits with subsidized
interest rates to their customers operating
outside Jakarta since September 1985.
Foreign banks have long requested more
freedom of operation in Indonesia. This
new development may be a first step in
expanding their activities. Similarly, for-
eign and joint venture companies can
receive export credits from state and
national private banks. This change cor-
responds to the major reform in economic
policy favoring export promotion.
V Prospects of the Indonesian Financial
Sector and Concluding Remarks
As the private industrial sector is ex-
pected to grow considerably in the next
decade, national private banks will cor-
respondingly have to serve as a crucial
promoter of investment. As widely re-
cognized, the banking sector is in a re-
latively advantageous position for collecting
market information and hiring well-trained
staff. Generally, it is known that the
latter are an extremely scarce resource
in Indonesia. In this regard, the banking
industry is expected to serve multiple
roles such as consultants, marketing and
accounting advisors, and even as technical
experts. Also, as monetization advances in
many regions, the regional development
banks are expected to lead regional indus-
trialization. At this present stage, these
banks are very fragile in many respects.
Nonetheless, in many areas, these banks
are probably the largest institutionalized
banks. Without their vitality regional
growth would not be so promising. In
this sense, their role should not be under-
estimated. In spite of their importance,
their relative share in assets and loans
has been in significant so far.
In addition, some key open economy
variables, which have become major factors
in Indonesian macroeconomic performance,
need to be carefully analyzed. In this
respect, it should be emphasized that the
scope of independent monetary policy in
Indonesia must be repeatedly questioned.
Almost certainly, policy options available
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to Indonesian monetary authorities must
be chosen in light of external economic
conditions.
Generally, policy actions introduced in
the 1980s seem to be a right step to
strengthen the Indonesian monetary
system and economic base. However, it is
uncertain whether these new policies will
be true effective in realizing the prolonged
high economic growth goal. Overall eco·
nomic policies need to be consistently
interwoven. The financial sector is still
relatively weak, and excessive expectations
may become a burden for it.
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